The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Opinion 2/15 was eagerly awaited as it was expected to bring much needed clarity to the scope of the post-Lisbon common commercial policy (CCP), and the exercise of European Union (EU) trade and investment policy more generally. At issue was the extent to which the EU is endowed with exclusive competence over the free trade agreement between the EU and Singapore (ESUFTA).1 A finding of exclusive EU competence over the agreement would empower the EU to conclude EUSFTA-type agreements without the involvement of national parliaments. By contrast, a finding of shared competence presupposes a political compromise in the Council to enable the EU to conclude the agreement alone;2 and in the event that parts of the agreement fall outside of EU competence altogether, the involvement of national parliaments would become inevitable.
Such 'mixed agreements' provide an instrument to balance the need for an effective implementation of the CCP with democratic legitimacy concerns by means of domestic parliamentary involvement. More recently, however, this practice has put the future of an effective EU trade and investment policy into disarray, when the signing and conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada was briefly held hostage by opposition of a regional Belgian parliament until only hours before it was set to be signed. The European Commission is now set to prioritize the conclusion of EU-only agreements in the future, taking into account the ruling in Opinion 2/15. The CJEU's decision concluded that all aspects of the EUSFTA fall within the ambit of the EU's exclusive competences, with the exception of non-direct investment and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Opinion 2/15 is remarkable in many respects. Four particular points are discussed in more detail in this comment. First, with its judgment the CJEU subsumes an extensive scope of policy areas under an exclusive external EU competence. Second, the CJEU places much emphasis on Article 21 Treaty on European Union (TEU) to support its findings of exclusive competence over sustainable development. Combined these two aspects will define future EU trade policy. Third, in light of the CJEU's strict dividing line between direct and non-direct investment it appears logically incoherent that the CJEU decided to remove ISDS entirely from the scope of exclusive EU competences rather than excluding it only in as far as it relates to non-direct investment. This may well reflect a discontent against ISDS provisions in future EU investment agreements. Fourth, the conclusions of the CJEU are somewhat disconnected from its reasoning. Although the CJEU finds that non-direct investment and ISDS are both areas of shared competences, it concludes that the EU cannot, therefore, conclude the agreement alone. On face value this abolishes the notion of facultative EU-only agreements, and deprives the EU legislator of an important means to exercise political discretion. The present comment attempts to contextualize Opinion 2/15 and discuss its implications for future EU trade and investment policy.
…
In its reasoning, the CJEU clearly distinguished between trade and investment aspects of the EUSFTA. Amongst the more controversial questions concerning the trade aspects of the opinion was whether or not transport services formed part of the post-Lisbon CCP, or whether this area had otherwise become an
